If the US Navy can't open the Strait of Hormuz, it's mad to suggest anyone else can

 As the US-Israeli war with Iran enters its sixth week, Tehran has turned the Strait of Hormuz into a weapon. Since early March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) has imposed a selective “permission-only” regime. Friendly-flagged tankers from China, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and a handful of others have been waved through and evidence of others paying a toll in non-dollar currencies is mounting.

Either way, global oil traffic is down more than 90 per cent. Key dependencies such as China have reserves “on the water” – i.e., ships that were already at sea, laden with oil and bound for them, but these will not last indefinitely. And it’s not just oil. Gas carriers, chemicals, fertilisers and general containers are all backed up, 300 to 400 are right there by the Strait; over 2,000 if you count every vessel that has been delayed or diverted so far. And you just know that conditions on some of those ships will be horrific.

The Houthis have now joined the fray. Of course they have. On March 28 they fired the first ballistic missile of this war at southern Israel and more followed. We know from 18 months of Red Sea disruption how good the Houthis are at escalation management. They hit hard enough and often enough to achieve their end states and no more. Tehran, where this playbook was written, knows it just as well. The language from President Trump that we are “obliterating” this or bombing that “back to the stone age” is both unhelpful and inaccurate. It suggests that there is an old-school front line that can be taken by force, when in reality there are thousands of mobile launchers of which only a few a day need to survive and shoot to retain control of the Strait. Destroying them is expensive, risky and hard to do.

Iran choosing on its own to stop interdicting the Strait, or being told to by China, remains the best two options, although both seem unlikely just now. The third way – Iran being made to stop – seems equally hard to envision. President Trump has been building off-ramps into his language since this started, and we’ve now seen “those who need it should reopen it” mentioned more than once. This shows a lack of understanding of how global oil markets work.

At the other extreme lies the threat of invasion, in particular of Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil-export terminal. In my mind, the number of ground troops in theatre for this remains light. Some of America’s best are there – Airborne and Marines – but it doesn’t look like the US is getting ready for a major campaign to me. The USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group is on the way with thousands more Marines, but she won’t be there until well outside the latest ultimatum of six days.

Then, if Trump sends the Marines in their landing ships into the Gulf to threaten Kharg then the “have they or have they not used mines in the Strait yet” question will be answered immediately. Taking smaller islands nearer the Strait would be militarily simpler, but the effect would be less.

Between these poles sits the newly forming UK-led coalition. Thirty-five nations – including France, Germany, Italy, Japan and key Gulf partners – gathered in London this week with a clear goal: to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait through diplomatic pressure. It is explicitly not a combat alliance joining the US-Israeli war. Britain has made clear throughout that it will not bomb Iranian targets. We have been flying defensive sorties from RAF Akrotiri and Qatar, we have sent a Type 45 destroyer to the Mediterranean (eventually) and we are spinning up RFA Lyme Bay for either an evacuation operation or to act as a mine-hunting mother ship.

One truth remains though: if Iran chooses not to stop shooting and controlling the Strait, there is very little we could do, even collectively. The idea that a disparate collection of well-meaning but medium-capability warships could collectively succeed where the US Navy has so far refused to even try is for the birds. But we should let the diplomatic collective play out – it’s a positive step and we have the lead.

As if causing the largest energy crisis in recent history wasn’t enough, President Trump is now upping the rhetoric about disbanding Nato, citing our collective failure to join his war as the reason. This shows a lack of understanding of what Nato is for and a callous disrespect for those who died answering the American call for collective security post-9/11. Meanwhile Russian and Chinese war planners are presumably looking on and reporting to their bosses that they literally couldn’t do this any better if they tried.

Back in the Strait, we remain locked in a situation that Iran controls and that no amount of bombs will change. Walking away would be a disaster: it would shatter trust, wreck international maritime norms and leave Iran financially well placed to rebuild its weapons and nuclear stockpiles.

As ever, diplomacy and persuasion remain the best levers. China will be key here and apart from protecting its own trade, Beijing has been relatively quiet so far. The UK-led grouping will play its role too, and it may yet prove to be an important one. Let’s hope so because every financial indicator is that this situation will get worse and may become catastrophic.